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This archival field study examined the relationships of supportive leadership, employee 
engagement, and safety outcomes in order to address the current knowledge gap regarding these 
concepts and also to test predictions of and extend the Job Demands-Job Resources Model.  
Participants were 3,312 employees from multiple departments located at 11 different locations of 
a large southeastern utility company. Data were collected on supportive leadership, employee 
engagement, and safety climate using archival data from self-report questionnaires.  Recordable 
injuries and first-aid instances were collected through the organization’s archival safety records.  
Three consecutive years of data were included in the study.  As expected, supportive leadership 
and employee engagement both showed a negative relationship with safety outcomes, as 
measured by first-aid instances and injury rates.  Partial support was found for the main 
hypothesis, which predicted employee engagement would mediate the relationship between 
supportive leadership and safety outcomes.  Significant mediation was found in two of the three 
years included in this study, as well is when all years were combined. The current study was the 
first to empirically test the relationship between supportive leadership and safety outcomes 
mediated by employee engagement.  The findings have implications for theory, research and, 
perhaps most importantly, practical application.
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The cost of workplace fatalities, injuries, and illnesses is substantial, both financially and 
personally.  According to the World Health Organization (as cited in Nahrgang, Morgeson, & 
Hofmann, 2011), it is estimated that such safety-related outcomes result in economic losses 
amounting to 4-5% of GDP.  In 2011, there were 4,609 workplace fatalities and nearly three 
million injuries and illnesses in the United States (Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of 
Labor, 2012).  Given these statistics, it is no surprise that occupational safety has generated a 
great deal of research, including multiple meta-analyses just in the past decade (Christian, 
Bradley, Wallace, & Burke, 2009; Clarke, 2006; Clarke, 2012; Clarke & Robertson, 2005; 
Nahrgang et al., 2011), and hundreds of empirical studies (Nahrgang et al., 2011).  Since the mid 
twentieth century, researchers have put forth a great deal of effort in the investigation of the 
antecedents of a safe workplace.  Some key predictors of safety behaviors have emerged, such as 
leadership (Barling, Loughlin, & Kelloway, 2002; Hofmann & Morgeson, 1999; Zohar & Lurie, 
2004), safety climate (Evans, Michael, Wiedenbeck, & Ray, 2005; Goldenhar, Williams, & 
Swanson, 2003; Hofmann & Stetzer, 1996), and employee engagement (Harter, Schmidt, & 
Hayes, 2002, Laschinger & Leiter, 2006; Nahrgang et al., 2011). 
 Though progress has been made in the area of occupational safety, there is still room for 
further research, especially surrounding the interrelationships among the key predictors of safety 
behavior.  Using the Job Demands-Job Resources (JDR) model (Bakker & Demerouti, 2007; 
Demerouti, Bakker, Nachreiner, & Schaufeli, 2001), several empirical studies have been 
conducted investigating the relationship between a supportive environment (including 
leadership), employee engagement, and multiple performance outcomes (Bakker, Demerouti, & 
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Euwema, 2005; Bakker, Demerouti, & Verbeke, 2004; Hofmann & Stetzer, 1996; Schaufeli, 
Bakker, & Van Rhenen, 2009).  However, there is a lack of research investigating the direct 
relationship between supportive leadership, employee engagement, and safety behaviors.  In 
Nahrgang and colleagues’ (2011) meta-analysis of 203 independent samples, leadership 
explained a significant amount of variance in the “satisfaction” facet of employee engagement, 
and engagement significantly related to adverse events and unsafe behaviors.  Unfortunately, 
there was no further investigation into the possible mediation of the leadership-to-safety 
relationship by employee engagement.  The current study seeks to build upon the JDR model by 
investigating a specific path proposed by the model which has yet to be supported, the link 
between supportive leadership, employee engagement, and safety outcomes.  
 The primary purpose of the current study is to understand the influence of employee 
engagement as a mediator of the relationship between the antecedent, supportive leadership, and 
the outcome variable, safety outcomes.  This study seeks to provide additional support to the 
JDR model by investigating the relationship between these three variables, which to this date has 
not been specifically addressed in research.  
 The following five sections include: 1) a review of the occupational safety literature, 2) a 
review of leadership and occupational safety, 3) a review of employee engagement and 
occupational safety, 4) the proposed theoretical link between supportive leadership, employee 
engagement, and occupational safety, and 5) a summary of hypotheses. 
Occupational Safety 
 Four meta-analyses focusing on occupational safety published in the past decade have 
found many predictors of safety behaviors and other safety outcomes.  Clarke (2006) looked at 
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safety climate as an important predictor of safety performance (participation and compliance), 
and accidents/injuries.  The researcher hypothesized safety performance would moderate the 
relationship between safety climate and accidents/injuries.  While safety climate was related to 
both the participation and compliance aspects of safety performance, the relationship between 
safety performance and accidents and injuries was not well supported.  The relationship was 
found to be moderated by research design.  These findings clearly indicate a need for more, and 
perhaps more thoughtfully designed, research studies in the area of safety climate and 
occupational injuries and accidents.  
 Christian et al. (2009) provides another example of the importance of moderating factors 
when studying occupational safety by looking at multiple predictors of safety performance and 
safety outcomes in a meta-analysis of 90 studies.  Predictors were categorized as either distal or 
proximal and situation-related or person related.  They hypothesized distal situation-related 
factors (safety climate and leadership) and distal person-related factors (personality 
characteristics and job attitudes) would predict proximal person-related factors (safety 
motivation and safety knowledge) which would relate to safety performance (compliance and 
participation) which, in the end, would predict safety outcomes (accidents and injuries).  
Predictions were generally supported.  Weak to moderate correlations between distal person- and 
situation-related factors and safety performance were found.  Similar to Clarke’s (2006) findings, 
safety climate was more strongly related to safety participation compared to safety compliance.  
This was also true for leadership.  Some distal person- and situation-related factors were weakly 
related to safety outcomes, others had no relationship.  Safety knowledge and safety motivation 
were the best predictors of safety performance.  Group-level safety climate, defined as shared 
perceptions of work environment characteristics as they pertain to safety matters that affect a 
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group of individuals, was found to be the strongest predictor of accidents and injuries.  The 
researchers concluded that their original hypothesis was supported based on the support for their 
exemplar model and pattern of meta-analytic correlations. 
 In another meta-analysis, Clarke (2005) looked at the relationship between the big five 
personality traits and accidents.  The researcher looked at both occupational and non-
occupational accidents, such as car accidents.  The findings indicated the relationship between 
personality traits and accidents was moderated by accident type.  Further analysis showed low 
agreeableness and neuroticism were related to occupational accidents, while extraversion, low 
agreeableness and low conscientiousness proved to be significant predictors of car accidents. 
 One of the most recent and largest meta-analyses related to safety was conducted by 
Nahrgang et al. (2011).  Using 203 independent samples the researchers looked at how job 
demands and job resources relate to workplace safety through health impairment and 
motivational processes.  Overall, they found general support for their model.  Job demands 
impaired health, positively related to burnout, and negatively related to engagement.  The 
opposite was true for job resources, which showed a positive relationship with employee 
engagement and a negative relationship with burnout.  Furthermore, the research showed burnout 
was negatively related to working safely, while employee engagement was positively related to 
working safely. 
In Nahrgang and colleagues’ (2011) meta-analysis the job demands category consisted of 
risks and hazards, physical demands, and complexity.  The job resources category included 
knowledge, autonomy, and a supportive environment (i.e., social support, leadership, and safety 
climate).  The researchers hypothesized that both burnout and employee engagement would 
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mediate the relationship between job demands/resources and safety outcomes.  To test these 
hypotheses a meta-analytic path model was estimated using the job demand and job resource that 
accounted for the most variance in the mediators and/or outcomes.  In this case, risks/hazards 
was treated as the job demand and safety climate was treated as the job resource for the meta-
analytic path model.  Results suggest burnout and engagement partially mediated the relationship 
between job demands/resources and safety behaviors. 
 Nahrgang et al. (2011) included four different types of industries in their meta-analysis: 
construction, healthcare, manufacturing/processing, and transportation.  Risks and hazards was 
the most consistent job demand in explaining variance in burnout, engagement, and safety 
outcomes.  However, the specific job demand that accounted for the most variance did differ 
across industries.  A supportive environment was the job resource that consistently explained the 
most variance in burnout, engagement, and safety outcomes.  This did not vary across industries.   
 The four meta-analyses discussed above begin to show a picture of the current state of the 
occupational safety literature.  Neal and Griffin (2002) proposed a summary of the relationships 
among antecedents, determinants, and components of safety performance.  This summary 
includes leadership, conscientiousness, and safety climate as antecedents, motivation and 
knowledge and skill as determinants, and safety compliance and participation as components of 
safety.  It is clear the research has focused more so on some aspects of Neal and Griffin’s (2002) 
model than others.  For instance, there is a great deal of focus placed on the importance of safety 
climate, and less on leadership, conscientiousness, or other possible antecedents.  Nahrgang et al. 
(2011) looked at leadership as part of the supportive environment job resource, but did not use 
leadership to conduct any additional analysis.  With the amount of resources organizations spend 
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on leadership training and safety training (individually), understanding the relationship between 
the two will be very beneficial. 
Leadership and Occupational Safety 
 Leadership has been a topic of interest to researchers since the early part of the twentieth 
century, and therefore has accumulated hundreds of studies (Avolio, Reichard, Hannah, 
Walumbwa, & Chan, 2009).  For the purpose of the current study, leadership studies of most 
interest are those that focus on safety as the criterion measure.  Transformational leadership has 
been shown to predict injury rates in many different populations, including both military and 
non-military (Barling et al., 2002; Kelloway, Mullen, & Francis, 2006; Zohar, 2002; Zohar & 
Luria, 2004).  However, this relationship has been found to be moderated or mediated by many 
other variables, such as leader-member relationships (Zohar & Luris, 2004), safety priorities 
(Zohar, 2002) safety climate (Barling et al., 2002; Kelloway et al., 2006; Zohar, 2002), and 
safety consciousness (Barling et al., 2002; Kelloway et al., 2006).   
 Though transformational leadership is the most popular type of leadership that has been 
studied in relation to occupational safety, other types have been investigated as well.  Hofmann 
and Morgeson (1999) looked at the relationship between leader-member exchange (LMX), safety 
communication, safety commitment, and accidents.  They hypothesized a model in which 
perceived organizational support and LMX lead to safety communication, which in turn leads to 
safety commitment, and finally to accidents.  The researchers found support for their model, as 
well as significant relationships between LMX and safety communication, safety commitment, 
and accidents (Hofmann & Morgeson, 1999).  Similarly, Mohamed’s (2002) study found both 
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management commitment and communication around safety was significantly related to safety 
climate, with safety climate being a significant predictor of safe work behaviors. 
Safety climate has been shown to be one of the ways leader behaviors can impact safety 
outcomes (Barling et al., 2002; Kelloway et al., 2006; Zohar, 2002).  In a study of restaurant 
workers, safety specific transformational leadership predicted injuries through the effects of 
perceived safety climate (Barling et al., 2002).  Kelloway and colleagues (2006) found passive 
and transformational leadership had opposite effects on safety climate, which then predicted 
safety events and injuries.  In another study, line supervisors were trained to better monitor and 
reward safety, after the training a significant increase in safety climate scores was reported 
(Zohar, 2002b).  Thompson, Hilton, and Witt (1998) looked at a more general “organizational 
climate” instead of specific safety climate, but found similar results; managers and supervisors 
can impact safety through the climate they foster. 
 Many studies on leadership and safety have been conducted in the medical field, due to 
the amount of importance placed on safety in this industry.  Künzle, Kolbe, and Grote (2010) 
reviewed the literature specifically related to leadership and safety in critical care teams.  The 
authors drew the conclusion that “…effective leaders play a pivotal role in promoting team 
performance and safety” (p. 1).  The authors defined effective leadership as consisting of clear 
and unambiguous behavior, which was also adaptive to the situation and shared between team 
members.  In an empirical study on nurses, researchers examined leaders as safety role-models, 
measured by the distribution of safety information and the leader’s priority given to safety (Katz-
Navon, Naveh, & Stern, 2007).  The level of role modeling in which the leader engaged was 
related to nurses’ safety self-efficacy, which predicted patient safety. 
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 The leadership – safety relationship is often times mediated or moderated by a third 
variable.  However, in one study, trust in leadership mediated the relationship between high-
performance work systems and safety performance and incidents (Zacharatos, Barling, & 
Iverson, 2005).  In this study, safety performance was measured in terms of personal-safety 
orientation, which consisted of safety knowledge, safety motivation, safety compliance, and 
safety initiative; safety incidents included injuries that required first aid and near misses.  
 In a longitudinal field study, Zohar (2002b) looked at the impact of training line 
supervisors to better monitor and reward safety.  This included making safety its own 
performance goal, not putting speed or schedule demands above safety, and increasing safety-
oriented interactions.  After training there was a significant decrease in minor injury rates and 
significant increases in safety climate scores and specific safety behaviors (e.g., earplug use). 
 One thing that many types of leadership have in common is that they all offer some kind 
of support.  Common types of support include inspirational support, transformational leadership, 
and support by communication and offering information and knowledge.  The variable 
‘leadership’ often falls into the category of supportive environment in studies looking at multiple 
environmental and organizational factors (Nahrgang et al., 2011; Parker, Axtell, & Turner, 
2001).  In their study, Parker and colleagues (2001) did not make a distinction between the 
multiple types of leadership.  Instead, they measured a more general concept of leadership, 
which they called supportive supervision.  Results showed that supportive supervision had a 
lagged (one year later) positive effect on safe working.  
Through decades of research and hundreds of studies it has become the consensus that 
leadership is related to safety outcomes.  The relationship has proven complex, with multiple 
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mediators and moderators, including leader-member relationships, safety climate, and safety 
consciousness.  The goal of this study is to add to the body of literature by examining the 
relationship between supportive leadership, employee engagement, and safety.  The review of 
the leadership and occupational safety literature leads to the first two hypotheses: 
H1: Supportive leadership is positively related to safety climate 
H2: Supportive leadership is negatively related to total injury rate  
Employee Engagement and Occupational Safety 
 Employee engagement has recently been defined as a positive, fulfilling, work-related 
state of mind characterized by vigor, dedication, and absorption (Schaufeli, Salanova, González-
Romá, & Bakker, 2002).  The majority of the most recent meta-analyses and reviews on 
occupational safety do not mention employee engagement (Christian, 2009; Clarke, 2005; 
Clarke, 2006; DeJoy, 2005).  A meta-analysis consisting of 7,939 business units in 36 different 
companies found only three studies measuring employee engagement and safety (Harter et al., 
2002).  Though there is not a great deal of research, the studies that have been conducted have 
clearly found a relationship between employee engagement and safety behaviors.  
One meta-analysis looked specifically at employee engagement and its effects on 
multiple business-unit outcomes (Hater et al., 2002).  Findings indicated business-unit level 
employee engagement predicted multiple business-unit outcomes, including accidents.  This 
meta-analysis used studies conducted by The Gallup Organization that used the Gallup 
Workplace Audit to measure employee engagement.  The items that make up the Gallup 
Workplace Audit are typically used as a measure of job satisfaction.  However, in this meta-
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analysis the researchers “refer to them as measures of employee engagement to differentiate 
these actionable work-group-level facets from the more general theoretical construct of job 
satisfaction” (Harter et al., 2002, p. 269).  The safety variable was a lost workday/time incident 
rate or a percentage of workdays lost because of incidents.  As noted previously, safety data were 
available for only three studies.  Significant relationships were found between employee 
engagement and customer satisfaction-loyalty, employee turnover, safety, productivity, and 
profitability, with safety being one of the strongest findings. 
In a more recent meta-analysis Nahrgang and colleagues (2011) were interested in the 
link between job demands, job resources, burnout, employee engagement, and safety outcomes.  
The study included 203 independent samples, though the researchers did not clearly state how 
many of those were used to analyze the employee engagement – safety relationship.  The 
researchers found that employee engagement significantly related to safety outcomes.  
Furthermore, a facet of employee engagement (compliance) partially mediated the relationship 
between job demands and job resources and safety outcomes.  A relationship between other job 
demands/resources, facets of employee engagement, and safety outcomes was not investigated.   
Although the academic research on employee engagement and safety is limited, 
organizations appear to be conducting internal research on these relationships.  Through their 
research in multiple organizations, The Gallup Organization has found negative safety outcomes 
(e.g., accidents, etc.) down by 50 percent among engaged employees compared to nonengaged 
and actively disengaged employees (Kimbell & Nink, 2006).  In a case study at the MolsonCoors 
beverage company, engaged employees were five times less likely to have a safety incident and 
seven times less likely to have a lost-time safety incident (Lockwood, 2007).  Translating safety 
   
 
11 
into dollar amounts, at MolsonCoors the average cost of a safety incident for engaged employees 
was $63, compared to $392 for nonengaged employees (Lockwood, 2007).  “Consequently, 
through strengthening employee engagement, the company saved $1,721,760 in safety costs in 
2002” (Lockwood, 2007, p. 3). 
Employee Engagement and Other Business Outcomes 
 While there is relatively little research on the relationship between employee engagement 
and safety, there is plenty of research relating employee engagement to other organizational 
outcomes.  For example, the Gallup Organization found employee retention up 44 percent and 
productivity up 50 percent for engaged employees compared to those employees classified as 
nonengaged or actively disengaged (Kimbell & Nink, 2006).  In a brief review of literature, 
Bakker and Schaufeli (2008) note that engaged employees are more creative, more productive, 
and more willing to go the extra mile.  In another review, researchers propose a performance 
management model emphasizing improving employee engagement in order to achieve higher 
business performance (Gruman & Saks, 2011). 
Employee engagement has been shown to predict business outcomes in multiple fields.  
In a study on Spanish hotel employees, engagement predicted customer-rated employee 
performance and customer loyalty, through service climate (Salanova, Agut, & Peiró, 2005).  In 
fire-fighters, engagement mediated the relationships of value congruence, perceived 
organizational support, and core self-evaluations with both task performance and organizational 
citizenship behaviors (Rich, LePine, & Crawford, 2010).  In another study, Xanthopoulou, 
Bakker, Demerouti, and Schaufeli (2009) asked Greek restaurant workers to keep daily diaries.  
Findings showed that performance was better and daily financial returns were higher on days 
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employees were more engaged.  A study conducted using participants from multiple different 
sectors and jobs found colleagues rated engaged employees higher on both in-role and extra-role 
behavior (Bakker et al., 2004).  
The review of the employee engagement literature leads to this study’s third hypothesis. 
H3: Employee engagement is negatively related to total injury rate  
Linking Leadership, Employee Engagement, and Occupational Safety through the Job-
Demands Job-Resource Model 
 There is a fair amount of research looking at how leadership relates to safety and at how 
leadership may interact with other variables (e.g., safety climate, leader-member relationships, 
safety consciousness) in relation to safety.  Leadership had been found to be related to employee 
engagement.  However, there are no empirical studies investigating how supportive leadership 
behaviors and employee engagement function to predict safety behaviors.   
 The JDR model is a useful conceptual model for understanding how a job resource, such 
as supportive leadership, may relate to safety behaviors through the motivational mechanism of 
employee engagement (Bakker & Demerouti, 2007; Demerouti et al., 2001).  The first premise of 
the JDR model is that in every job there are certain job demands and job resources, which is a 
well-supported claim (Schaufeli, Bakker, & Van Rhenen, 2009).  Job demands are “physical, 
psychological, social, or organizational aspects of a job that require sustained physical and/or 
psychological (cognitive or emotional) effort or skills” and are therefore associated with 
physiological and psychological costs (Bakker & Demerouti, 2007, p. 312).  Examples include: 
intense work pressure, unfavorable working conditions, and physically or emotionally 
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demanding tasks.  Job resources are “physical, psychological, social or organizational aspects of 
the job that are either/or: functional in achieving work goals, reduce job demands, stimulate 
personal grown, learning, and development” (Bakker & Demerouti, 2007, p. 312).  Some 
examples are a supportive environment, autonomy, and job knowledge.  
 The second premise of the JDR model is that two different underlying psychological 
processes play a role in developing job strain and job motivation.  The first is the health 
impairment process, in which constant job demands exhaust employees (emotionally and 
physically), and can lead to burnout.  The other process is the motivational process.  Under the 
JDR model, job resources are assumed to increase motivation and lead to outcomes such as 
employee engagement and high performance.  Put simply, job demands lead to exhaustion and 
burnout, while job resources lead to motivation and employee engagement.  However, the two 
processes are not mutually exclusive.  Job demands can negatively affect employee engagement, 
while job resources decrease the likelihood of burnout.   
 Finally, the JDR model posits that burnout and employee engagement will be related to 
multiple organizational outcomes.  Burnout, caused by the strain of job demands and/or lack of 
job resources, has a negative impact on organizational outcomes.  Conversely, employee 
engagement, caused by the motivational aspects of job resources, has a positive relationship with 
organizational outcomes.  Just as the JDR model is not limited to certain types of work or jobs, 
nor is it limited to predicting specific organizational outcomes.  Empirical support for the JDR 
model has been growing over the past decade.   
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Evidence supporting the JDR Model 
 The initial assumption of the JDR model is that all jobs have certain demands they place 
on employees, and that these job demands relate to burnout.  Bakker, Demerouti, and Euwema 
(2005) found evidence of this in their study of employees at a university, using work overload, 
emotional demands, physical demands, and work-home interference as job demands.  Work 
overload is a common job demand, though how it is measured varies from industry to industry.  
In a study with nurses, work overload was measured by staffing adequacy (Laschinger & Leiter, 
2006).  Researchers found that staffing adequacy had a significant inverse relationship with 
emotional exhaustion (e.g., burnout), which was in turn related to patient safety outcomes.  
Another study looking at work overload, along with emotional demands, found these job 
demands related to burnout, and burnout to be predictive of future sickness duration (Schaufeli 
et. al., 2009). 
 Increasing job resources is one way to attempt to weaken the relationship between job 
demands and burnout and buffer against the negative effects job demands can have on 
engagement.  In one study conducted in Finland, researchers looked at student misconduct as a 
job demand and how it related to work engagement in teachers (Bakker, Hakanen, Demerouti, & 
Xanthopoulou, 2007).  Out of six job resources measured, four (supervisor support, 
innovativeness, appreciation, and organizational climate) helped to buffer against the negative 
effect student misconduct had on teacher work engagement.  In an earlier study, Bakker and 
colleagues (2005) looked at a more complex relationship between job demands and job 
resources.  This study included multiple job demands, multiple job resources, and three different 
facets of burnout. Job demands and resources interacted differently depending on the facet of 
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burnout.  However, the majority of the time, job resources did buffer against the affects job 
demands had on two of the facets of burnout (exhaustion and cynicism).  These studies show that 
job resources are not only important because of their relationship with employee engagement, 
but also with their positive effects on employee burnout.  
 The impact job resources have on employee engagement has been shown in multiple 
studies across many occupational groups.  An early study of the JDR model looked at this 
relationship in the service industry, the production/manufacturing industry, and the transportation 
industry (Demerouti et al., 2001).  In all three industries researchers looked at feedback, rewards, 
job control, participation, job security, and supervisor support as job resources.  In all three 
industries a clear relationship between job resources and employee engagement was found. 
 One of the few longitudinal studies looking at the JDR model was conducted by 
Schaufeli and colleagues (2009) on telecommunications managers.  Researchers measured three 
job demands and four job resources at one point in time, along with two facets of both burnout 
and engagement.  All variables were measured again one year later.  Analysis showed that 
changes in job demands and resources predicted future burnout and work engagement.  When 
job demands increased and job resources decreased, future burnout scores increased (after 
controlling for time one burnout scores).  When job resources increased, future work engagement 
also increased (after controlling for work engagement scores in time one).  Additionally, burnout 
was related to future sickness duration, while engagement related to future sickness frequency.  
Overall, their study supports the motivational process proposed by the JDR model.  
 A recent meta-analysis sought to understand the link between both job demands and 
resources with employee engagement and burnout (Crawford et al., 2010).  The meta-analysis 
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consisted of 55 manuscripts and articles and looked at multiple job demands and job resources.  
Using meta-analytic structural modeling, the results indicated that all types of job resources 
(feedback, support, autonomy, etc.) were significantly related to employee engagement, whereas 
only some job demands showed a significant negative relationship with engagement.  Job 
resources also consistently displayed a negative relationship with burnout, while job demands 
showed a consistent positive relationship with burnout.  The importance of job resources for 
employee engagement was highlighted again in a recent view of engagement (Bakker, 2011).  
The author noted job resources, such as performance feedback, social support, autonomy, skill 
variety, and learning opportunities have consistently been related to engagement.  In addition, 
personal resources (i.e., positive self-evaluations) are also important for engagement, which led 
to the researcher’s conclusion “that job and personal resources are the main predictors of 
engagement” (Bakker, 2011, p. 265).  
 Though the link between job resources and engagement has been supported in a number 
of studies, the role leadership plays as a job resource has not attracted much attention in the JDR 
literature.  Social support, or a supportive environment, is a fairly common and well supported 
job resource (Crawford et al., 2010; Nahrgang et al., 2011).  Leadership is generally assumed to 
fall under the umbrella of supportive environment or social support.  According to the premises 
of the JDR model, if leadership is a job resource, it is related to employee engagement, which is 
related to performance outcomes.  There is already some evidence that supports this idea. 
 In two very recent studies conducted abroad, one in China and the other in Korea, 
researchers found transformational leadership was related to performance outcomes, via its 
relationship with engagement (Ayree, Walumbwa, Zhou, & Hartnell, 2012; Song, Kolb, Lee, & 
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Kim, 2012).  Ayree and colleagues (2012) collected data from a large telecommunications 
company in China to examine the leadership—engagement—performance relationship.  Their 
results showed transformational leadership predicted engagement, which in turn related to 
innovative behavior and task performance.  Similar results were found in a study in which data 
were collected from multiple organizations within Korea (Song et al., 2012).  Their results 
showed transformational leadership related to both engagement and their performance variable, 
referred to as organizational knowledge creation.  Moreover, engagement mediated the 
relationship between transformational leadership and knowledge creation.  These two studies 
lend support to leadership as a job resource and how it fits into the JDR model. 
 The support for the relationship between job resources and employee engagement is 
strong and leads to the fourth hypothesis of the present study. 
H4: Supportive leadership is positively related to employee engagement. 
The JDR Model and Occupational Safety    
 With research on the JDR model growing in the past decade, studies have used it to 
predict multiple performance outcomes, including innovative behavior (Ayree et al., 2012), in-
role and extra-role performance (Bakker et al., 2004), customer loyalty (Salanova et al., 2005) 
turnover intention (Schaufeli & Bakker, 2001), sickness frequency and duration (Schaufeli et al, 
2009), and financial returns (Xanthopoulou et al., 2009).  Very few studies have used the JDR 
model in relation to occupational safety outcomes. 
 A study conducted on construction workers looked at multiple work-related stressors (job 
demands) and how they related to self-reported injuries and near misses (Goldenhar et al, 2003).  
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Of the 12 work stressors measured, 10 significantly predicted injuries and near misses.  Another 
study, conducted before the introduction of the JDR model, investigated how a supportive 
environment (a job resource) was related to unsafe behaviors and accidents in a chemical 
processing plant (Hofmann & Stetzer, 1996).  Results showed aspects of a supportive 
environment, namely work group process and safety climate, significantly related to unsafe 
behaviors and actual accidents. 
 Recently, Nahrgang and colleagues (2011) conducted a meta-analysis focusing on 
workplace safety, using the JDR model to link job demands, job resources, burnout, engagement, 
and safety outcomes.  In their model, job demands consisted of risks and hazards, physical 
demands, and task complexity.  Job resources were knowledge, autonomy, and a supportive 
environment (including social support, leadership, and safety climate).  The safety outcomes they 
examined were accidents and injuries, adverse events, and unsafe behaviors.  Analysis showed 
all job resources were significantly related to burnout, engagement, and safety outcomes.  Risk 
and hazards and task complexity were also related to burnout, engagement, and safety outcomes.  
Researchers then took the job demand (risks and hazards) and job resource (safety climate) that 
accounted for the most unique variance in the mediator/outcome to test the mediation hypotheses 
of the JDR model.  Burnout and engagement partially mediated the relationship between risk and 
hazards and safety climate with safety outcomes. 
Safety Climate and Safety Behaviors 
 Similar to leadership, safety climate has been a popular area of study for decades (Zohar, 
2010).  The research relating safety climate with safety behaviors draw clear conclusions 
regarding the importance of safety climate on safety related outcomes (Zohar, 2010).  In 
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Christian and colleague’s (2009) meta-analysis, group safety climate proved to be the strongest 
predictor of occupational injuries.  Another meta-analysis showed a strong relationship between 
safety climate and safety performance (compliance and participation), but a weak relationship 
between safety climate and accidents (Clarke, 2006).  
 Also similar to leadership, safety climate is considered a job resource in the JDR model 
(Nahrgang et al., 2011).  There have been multiple studies using safety climate as a job resource 
supporting the JDR model.  Hofmann and Stetzer (1996) measured safety climate as part of a 
supportive environment, which predicted unsafe behaviors in a chemical processing plant.  
Safety climate has also been shown to relate to safety communication (Hofmann & Stetzer, 
1998).  In a study conducted with nurses, safety climate weakened the relationship between 
client variability and occupational strain, which was then related to injury (Chowdhury & 
Enders, 2010).  Another study found when there was a strong safety climate incident rates were 
lower among production workers (Evans et al., 2005).  Law, Dollard, Tuckey, and Dormann 
(2011) tested part of the JDR model (the link between job resources and engagement) using 
safety climate as the job resource and found support for the relationship between safety climate 
and employee engagement.  Also testing the JDR model, a study on aviation maintenance 
personnel found the relationship between safety climate and errors to be at least partially 
mediated by psychological strain (Fogarty, 2004).  The safety climate research supports the 
following two hypotheses.            
H5: Safety climate is positively related to employee engagement 
H6: Safety climate is negatively related to total injury rate  
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 Nahrgang and colleagues’ (2011) recent meta-analysis is the most comprehensive look at 
how the JDR model may help in understanding and reducing accidents in the work place.  
However, many relationships were not fully tested in the analysis.  One relationship of interest is 
the leadership, employee engagement, and safety outcomes relationship.  Leadership accounted 
for a significant amount of unique variance in engagement as well as the safety outcomes, but 
there was no further analysis.  In most organizations, leadership is viewed as one of the most 
important antecedents to many performance outcomes, including safety.  A study aimed 
specifically at examining the leadership—safety relationship, and its possible meditation by 
engagement, would be a valuable addition to the JRD model literature, and could have practical 
implications to work place safety, which leads to the following hypotheses: 
H7: Employee engagement will mediate the relationship between supportive leadership 
and total injury rate. 
H8: Employee engagement will mediate the relationship between safety climate and total 
injury rate. 
  




Summary of Hypotheses 
1 Supportive leadership is positively related to safety climate 
2 Supportive leadership is negatively related to total injury rate 
3 Employee engagement is negatively related to total injury rate 
4 Supportive leadership is positively related to employee engagement 
5 Safety climate is positively related to employee engagement 
6 Safety climate is negatively related to total injury rate 
7 
Employee engagement will mediate the relationship between supportive leadership and 
total injury rate 
8 Employee engagement will mediate the relationship between safety climate and total injury rate 
 
 



















 The current archival field study examined the relationships among supportive leadership, 
employee engagement, and first-aid and injury rates in a work environment.  Supportive 
leadership, employee engagement, safety climate, and first-aid and injury rates are the measured 
variables.  Supportive leadership, employee engagement, and safety climate data were gathered 
through self-report questionnaires, completed once per year over the course of three fiscal years 
(October-September), 2007-2009.  The questionnaire used to collect data on supportive 
leadership, safety climate, and employee engagement was designed by a psychologist working 
for the organization.  Past research, theory, and common best practices for employee engagement 
surveys were used to design the survey items.  The employee population responding to the 
questionnaire varied across years due to turnover, and the archival data did not include identifies 
to link individual employee responses over the course of the three years.  Because of this, the 
extent to which the populations overlap from year to year cannot be determined.  Supportive 
leadership, employee engagement, and safety climate data were all measured at the individual 
level. 
The organization’s archival records were used to gather first-aid and recordable injury 
data for multiple locations within the organization for three fiscal years, 2007-2009, which 
overlap with the survey data.  First aid and recordable injury data were only available as an 
aggregate at the site level.  Individual level injury data were not available from the organization’s 
archival records.  Therefore, individual level data were obtained for the predictor measures and 
aggregated site level data were obtained for the criterion measures.  




 The population for this study consisted of 1,577 employees in 2007, 569 employees in 
2008, and 1,166 employees in 2009.  Because the archival dataset did not provide unique 
identifiers for employees from year to year and due to turnover it cannot be known the total 
number of unique individuals included in the study.  Employees came from multiple departments 
located at 11 different locations of a utility company.1  Locations spanned three states and were 
power generation sites.  The respondent population was 82% male and 76% identified 
themselves as white.  Seventy-nine percent of employees had tenures with the company of more 
than five years, with 16% having tenures greater than 30 years.  The majority of respondents 
were trades, labor, and craft workers, at 72% 
Procedures 
For each of the three survey administrations supportive leadership, employee 
engagement, and safety climate were measured at one time, as part of a larger organizational 
health survey.  Employees had two weeks to complete the survey.  Employees were notified of 
the survey via email, which included a link to complete the survey.  Employees also received two 
reminder emails during the course of the survey window.  It was made clear via the emails that 
participation in the survey was voluntary and that one’s responses were confidential.  Employees 
completed the survey during regular working hours.  Paper copies of the survey were provided 
for employees who wished to participate but did not have regular access to a work computer. 
In 2007, all employees in the organization were invited to participate in the survey, with a  
1
  At three sites within the company total injury was near zero and was consistently significantly lower than the other 
sites within the organization, because of this those sites were not included in data analysis. 
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response rate of 80.2%.   In 2008, only half of the employees of the organization were asked to 
participate.  Employees invited to participate were chosen at random.  The response rate in 2008 
was 69%.  In 2009, again, all employees were invited to participate, and the survey ended with a 
73.8% response rate.  
First-aid rates and injury rates were gathered from the organization’s archival records for 
each year.  
Measures 
Supportive Leadership 
Supportive Leadership was measured using a five-item scale.  The response format for 
this measure was a 5-point Likert scale (1=strongly disagree to 5=strongly agree) with an “N/A” 
response option.  The reliability of this 5-item scale for this sample was α = .88.  A sample item 
from the scale is: “My supervisor takes the time often enough to talk about my progress on the 
job”. 
Employee Engagement 
Employee Engagement was measured using a six-item scale.  The response format for 
this measure was a 5-point Likert scale (1=strongly disagree to 5=strongly agree) with an “N/A” 
response option.  The reliability of this 6-item scale for this sample was α = .85.  A sample item 
from the scale is: “I am proud to work at [organization]”. 
 
 




Safety Climate was measured using a two-item scale.  The response format for this 
measure was a 5-point Likert scale (1=strongly disagree to 5=strongly agree) with an “N/A” 
response option.  The reliability of this 2-item scale for this sample was α = .77.  A sample item 
from the scale is: “I feel comfortable reporting an unsafe act or condition”.    
Recordable Injuries 
 Recordable injuries were gathered from the company’s Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA) Injury Report for each year.  Injuries are classified as recordable if the 
injury or illness results in one of the following: death, days away from work, restricted work or 
transfer to another job, medical treatment beyond first aid, loss of consciousness, or a significant 
injury or illness diagnosed by a physician or other licensed health care professional.  Injury 
classifications include: amputation; bite, sting; bruise, contusion; burn; concussion, unconscious; 
cut, laceration, puncture; exhaustion, heat stroke; electric shock; foreign body; fracture, crush, 
dislocate; hernia; loss of senses; occupational illness/disease; scratch, abrasion; sprain, strain, 
torn; suffocation, inhalation. 
First Aid Injuries 
 First aid injuries were gathered from the company’s First Aid Injury Log for each year.  
An injury or illness is categorized as a first aid injury if it requires only basic first aid and does 
not result in any of the criteria listed above for a recordable injury.  Over-the-counter medication, 
cleaning of wounds, eye patches, and hot/cold treatment are some examples of first-aid.  Injury 
classifications include: bite, sting; bruise, contusion; burn; cut, laceration, puncture; exhaustion, 
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heat stroke; foreign body; facture, crush, dislocate; occupational illness/disease; scratch, 
abrasion; sprain, strain, torn.  
Variables 
Supportive leadership was measured with a five-item scale.  All responses were scored 
from 1 to 5 with a maximum aggregated average score of 5.0 representing the highest level of 
supportive leadership and a minimum aggregated average score of 1.0 representing the lowest 
level of supportive leadership.  Scores were averaged for each respondent each of the three years. 
 Employee engagement was measured with a six-item scale.  All responses were scored 
from 1 to 5 with a maximum aggregated average score of 5.0 representing the highest level of 
employee engagement and a minimum aggregated average score of 1.0 representing the lowest 
level of employee engagement.  Scores were averaged for each respondent each of the three 
years. 
 Safety climate was measured with a two-item scale.  All responses were scored from 1 to 
5 with a maximum aggregated average score of 5.0 representing the highest level of safety 
climate and a minimum aggregated average score of 1.0 representing the lowest level of safety 
climate.  Scores were averaged for each respondent each of the three years. 
Total injury rate was created as an aggregate of recordable injuries and first aid injuries 
per site per year.  Recordable injuries and first-aid injuries were aggregated to create one total 
injury rate variable for two reasons.  First, there is no theoretical reason to assume the predictor 
variables (supportive leadership, safety climate, and employee engagement) would differently 
affect recordable injuries versus first-aid injuries.  Second, both types of injuries are rare and 
have little variance, combining them into one total injury rate variable allowed for increased 
variance in a single outcome measure.   
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In order to create total injury rates for each site for all three years, recordable and first aid 
injury rates were first computed.  Recordable injury rates were computed for each site by 
dividing the total number of recordable injuries at the site by the number of employees at the site 
in the same year.  This was done for each of the three years.  First aid injury rates were computed 
for each site by dividing the total number of first-aid injuries at the site by the number of 
employees at the site in the same year.  This was done for each of the three years.  Recordable 
injury rate and first aid injury rate were then combined to create total injury rate with a 
maximum aggregated average of .1049 representing the highest level of total injury rate and a 
minimum aggregated average of .01188 representing the lowest level of total injury rate.  All 
participants at a given site in a given year had the same total injury rate.  This was because injury 
data were only available at the site level, and not the individual level.   
  






Data Analysis and Results 
Hypotheses were analyzed using two statistical methods.  Hypotheses 1-6 were analyzed 
using the Pearson r correlation coefficient.  Hypotheses 7 and 8 were analyzed using the 
bootstrap method of mediation.  The bootstrap method of mediation involves the random 
sampling of the data several times and testing for mediation each time (Preacher & Hays, 2008).  
Estimates from the bootstrap method are more robust and form the basis of the confidence 
intervals that are reported (Balkundi, Barsness, & Michael, 2009).  This method is applicable 
when sample size is small, the effect size is predicted to be small, or, as is the case with the 
current study, when assumptions of classical statistical methods are not met (MacKinnon, 
Lockwood, & Williams, 2004; Mallinckrodt, Abraham, Wei, & Russell, 2006; Shrout & Bolger, 
2002).  In the current study, the criterion measure, total injury rate, is not normally distributed.  
One can also assume the effect size will be small, given the low injury rate and restricted 
variance.  Based on these considerations, bootstrapping is the appropriate statistical method to 
test for mediation for hypotheses 7 and 8.   
Descriptive Statistics 
The N, mean, standard deviation, and minimum and maximum values for all variables in 
the study can be found in Table 2.  The descriptive statistics are also broken down by year, 2007, 
2008, and 2009, as well as a composite of all years, 2007-2009.  As can be seen in Table 2, out 
of the three predictor variables, safety climate was the highest scoring variable throughout the 
three years, with an average of 3.75.  Safety climate also had the highest average standard 
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deviation, 1.03.  Supportive leadership was the lowest scoring predictor, with a three year 
average of 3.21.  Employee engagement averaged the lowest standard deviation of the predictor 
variables at 0.77.  
Table 2 
Study Variables: Descriptive Statistics for Years 2007-2009 
  
Mean SD Min Max 
Safety 
Climate 
2007 3.81 0.97 1 5 
2008 3.79 1.01 1 5 
2009 3.64 1.1 1 5 
2007-2009 3.75 1.03 1 5 
Supportive 
Leadership 
2007 3.26 0.91 1 5 
2008 3.24 0.91 1 5 
2009 3.12 0.97 1 5 
2007-2009 3.21 0.93 1 5 
Employee 
Engagement 
2007 3.67 0.75 1 5 
2008 3.66 0.74 1 5 
2009 3.58 0.8 1 5 
2007-2009 3.63 0.77 1 5 
Total Injury 
Rate 
2007 0.0385 0.0141 0.0150 0.0686 
2008 0.0359 0.0174 0.0119 0.0662 
2009 0.0565 0.0243 0.0124 0.1049 
2007-2009 0.0445 0.0209 0.0124 0.1049 
2007 N = 1,577; 2008 N = 569; 2009 N = 1166; 2007-2009 N = 1322 
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A one-way ANOVA was conducted to investigate any differences there may have been 
across years.   Results of the ANOVA show the average of all three predictor variables (safety 
climate, supportive leadership, and employee engagement) were significantly lower in 2009 than 
the previous two years (p < .05).  Average predictor scores from 2007 and 2008 did not 
significantly differ from one another. 
Average total injury rates were also significantly different from year to year.  Results of 
the ANOVA showed the average total injury rate was significantly higher in 2009 than in 2007 
or 2008 (p < .001).  Average total injury rate was also significantly higher in 2007 than in 2008 
(p < .05).  Therefore, total injury rate significantly differed across all three years, with 2008 
having the lowest average total injury rate and 2009 having the highest average total injury rate.  
Correlations and Hypotheses 1-6 Testing 
 Hypotheses 1- 6 were tested using the Pearson r correlations coefficient.  The correlations 
matrices for each year, as well as the composite for all years, can be seen in table 3.  Hypotheses 
1, 4, and 5 predicted supportive leadership, safety climate, and employee engagement would be 
positively related to one another.  Theses hypotheses were fully supported with all three 
variables having significantly positive relationships (p < .01) with one another for all three years, 
as well as the composite for 2007-2009.  Correlations ranged from r = .716, for supportive 
leadership and safety climate, to r = .532, for employee engagement and safety climate. 
 Hypothesis 2 predicted supportive leadership relates negatively to total injury rate, this 
relationship was partially supported.  In 2007, supportive leadership showed a slightly positive 
relationship with total injury rate, though the correlation was not significant (r = .036, p = .150).   
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Supportive leadership had a non-significant negative correlation with total injury rate in 2008 (r 
= -.058, p = .168).  In 2009, and overall (2007-2009), supportive leadership showed a 
significantly negative relationship with total injury rate at the p < .01 level (r = -.125 and r = -
.079, respectively).  Thus, data partially supported hypothesis 2, supportive leadership and total 
injury rate have a negative relationship with one another.   
 Hypothesis 3 predicted employee engagement would have a negative relationship with 
total injury rate.  This hypothesis was partially supported.  In 2008, 2009, and the 2007-2009 
composite, employee engagement showed a significant negative relationship with total injury 
rate with r = -.112, r = -.155, and r = -.091, respectively (p < .01 for all).  However, in 2007, 
employee engagement had a non-significant positive correlation with total injury rate (r = .047, p 
= .061).  Due to the 2007 correlation, hypothesis 3 was only partially supported.   
 Hypothesis 6 stated safety climate relates negatively to total injury rate, this hypothesis 
was partially supported.  Safety climate showed a negative, though non-significant, correlation 
with total injury rate in both 2007 and 2008 (r = -.013, p =.600; r = -.06, p = .154, respectively).  
In 2009, and when all years were combined, safety climate had a significant negative relationship 
with total injury rate (r = -.068, p < .05; r = -.075, p < .05, respectively).  Though all correlations 
were in the predicted direction, only two of the four were significant, therefore hypothesis 6 was 
partially supported.          
  






Variable 1 2 3 4 
2007 
1.  Safety Climate .78    
2.  Supportive Leadership .713** .87   
3.  Employee Engagement .587** .702** .85  
4.  Total Injury Rate -.013 .036 .047 -- 
2008 
1.  Safety Climate .76    
2.  Supportive Leadership .716** .88   
3.  Employee Engagement .586** .689** .86  
4.  Total Injury Rate -.060 -.058 -.122** -- 
2009 
1.  Safety Climate .77    
2.  Supportive Leadership .703** .88   
3.  Employee Engagement .532** .668** .86  
4.  Total Injury Rate -.068* -.125** -.155** -- 
2007-2009 
1.  Safety Climate .77    
2.  Supportive Leadership .711** .88   
3.  Employee Engagement .567** .688** .85  
4.  Total Injury Rate -.075** -.079** -.091** -- 
2007 N = 1,577; 2008 N = 569; 2009 N = 1,166; 2007-1009 N = 3,312 
Bold diagonal entries show scale reliabilities calculated using Cronbach’s Alpha 
* = p< .05 
** = p< .01 
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Tests for Mediation 
Hypothesis 7 predicted employee engagement would mediate the relationship between 
supportive leadership and total injury rate.  To test this hypothesis the bootstrapping test for 
mediation was conducted for each year of the study as well as all years combined, 2007-2009.  
The results suggest that the indirect (mediated) effects of supportive leadership on total injury 
rate through employee engagement are statistically significant in three out of the four analyses, 
given that none of the 95% confidence intervals contain zero.  Confidence intervals can be seen 
in table 4.  For all significant meditation analyses regression weights for supportive leadership to 
employee engagement are positive, and all regression weights for employee engagement to total 
injury rate are negative.  This indicates higher supportive leadership is related to increased 
employee engagement which is related to lower total injury rates. Regression weights for 
supportive leadership to total injury rate are all non-significant, which is consistent with 
mediation.  Regression weights can be seen in table 6.  The only year where the mediated 
relationship is not significant is 2007, which would be expected based on the 2007 correlations 
discussed earlier in the section.  The other three bootstrapping analyses suggest the relationship 
of supportive leadership on total injury rate is mediated by employee engagement.  Therefore, 
hypothesis 7 was partially supported. 
Hypothesis 8 predicted employee engagement would mediate the relationship between 
safety climate and total injury rate.  To test this hypothesis the same bootstrapping analyses were 
conducted as to test hypothesis 7.  The results suggest that the indirect (mediated) effects of 
safety climate on total injury rates through employee engagement are statistically significant for 
all three years as well as overall, given that none of the 95% confidence intervals contain zero.  
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Confidence intervals can be seen in table 5.  Interestingly, the 2007 results show the relationship 
in the opposite direction of the other three years, with positive confidence intervals instead of 
negative.  Regression weights for the 2007 analysis show the direct path from safety climate to 
total injury rate is significantly negative (β = -.062, p<.05).  However the direct path from 
employee engagement to total injury rate is significantly positive (β = .084, p< .01).  Taking into 
consideration the confidence intervals and the regression weights, this analysis suggests partial 
mediation by employee engagement on the relationship between safety climate and total injury 
rate in 2007.  For 2008, 2009, and 2007-2009, regression weights for safety climate to employee 
engagement are all positive, and regression weights for employee engagement to total injury rate 
are negative, indicating higher safety climate is related to increased employee engagement which 
is related to decreased total injury rates.  All regression weights for safety climate to total injury 
rate are non-significant, supporting mediation.  Regression weights can be seen table 7.  The 
analyses testing hypothesis 8 are mixed, with three of the analyses supporting mediation and one 
supporting only partial mediation and in the inverse direction of the other three analyses.  Thus, 
only partial support was found for hypothesis 8.  
Table 4 
Bootstrapping-Based Mediation of Supportive Leadership on Total Injury Rate 
Through Employee Engagement 
Bootstrap Results 
  Percentile 95% CI Bias Corrected 95% CI 
 Year Lower Upper Lower Upper 
2007 -0.013 0.071 -0.015 0.070 
2008 -0.158 -0.032 -0.158 -0.033 
2009 -0.131 -0.043 -0.130 -0.042 
2007-2009 -0.075 -0.021 -0.074 -0.021 
CI = confidence interval 
 




Bootstrapping-Based Mediation of Safety Climate on Total Injury Rate Through 
Employee Engagement  
Bootstrap Results 
  Percentile 95% CI Bias Corrected 95% CI 
Year Lower Upper Lower Upper 
2007 0.017 0.079 0.017 0.079 
2008 -0.118 -0.021 -0.118 -0.022 
2009 -0.12 -0.058 -0.12 -0.057 
2007-2009 -0.06 -0.021 -0.06 -0.021 
CI = confidence interval 
 
Table 6 
Standardized Regression Weights for Supportive Leadership and Total Injury Rate Mediated by 
Employee Engagement 
Employee Engagement Total Injury Rate 
Variable 2007 2008 2009 07-09 2007 2008 2009 07-09 
Supportive Leadership .702*** .689*** .668*** .688*** .006 .037 -.04 -.032 
Employee Engagement -- -- -- -- .043 -.138* -.128*** -.069** 
*p<.05. **p<.01. ***p<.001 
 
Table 7 
Standardized Regression Weights for Safety Climate and Total Injury Rate Mediated by Employee 
Engagement 
Employee Engagement Total Injury Rate 
Variable 2007 2008 2009 07-09 2007 2008 2009 07-09 
Safety Climate .587*** .586*** .668*** .567*** -.062* .009 .02 -.035 
Employee Engagement -- -- -- -- .084** -.118* -.165*** -.071*** 
*p<.05. **p<.01. ***p<.001 
  






The primary purpose of the current study was to understand the influence of employee 
engagement as a mediator of the relationship between supportive leadership and safety 
outcomes.  This study seeks to provide additional support to the JDR model by investigating the 
relationship between supportive leadership, employee engagement, and safety outcomes, which 
to this date had not been specifically addressed in research.  The current study also sought to 
provide further support for the mediated relationship of safety climate on safety outcomes 
through employee engagement (Nahrgang et al., 2011).  The following section provides a 
summary of the results, post hoc analyses, general discussion, limitations and implications of the 
current field study. 
Summary of Results 
 The current study hypothesized that supportive leadership, safety climate, and employee 
engagement relate positively to one another.  Support was found for all three of these 
relationships.  Moderate to strong significant positive correlations were found between 
supportive leadership, safety culture, and employee engagement each year over the course of 
three years.  This result adds to the current body of knowledge regarding supportive leadership 
and safety climate (Barling et al., 2002; Kelloway et al., 2006; Zohar, 2002),  and supportive 
leadership and employee engagement (Ayree et al., 2012; Song et al., 2012).  The results also 
lend support to the less studied relationship between safety climate and employee engagement 
(Law et al., 2011; Nahrgang et al., 2012). 
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 It was also hypothesized that supportive leadership would negatively relate to total injury 
rate.  Through decades of research and hundreds of studies it has become the general consensus 
that leadership is related to safety outcomes, though the relationship has proven complex, with 
multiple mediators and moderators (Barling et al., 2002; Hofmann & Morgeson, 1999; Kelloway 
et al., 2006; Nahrgang et al., 2011; Zohar, 2002).  In this study, only partial support was found 
for the negative relationship between supportive leadership and total injury rate.  In 2007, 
supportive leadership had a non-significant positive correlation with total injury rate.  A non-
significant negative relationship was found between the two variables in 2008.  In 2009 and in 
the composite correlation, including all data from 2007 to 2009, supportive leadership was found 
to have a significant negative relationship with total injury rate.  Therefore, the hypothesis was 
supported by one of the three years of data, as well as by the combined data. 
 Employee engagement was hypothesized to have a negative relationship with total injury 
rate as well. While the research on employee engagement and safety outcomes in not as 
pervasive as that of leadership and safety outcomes, some studies, and at least one meta-analysis, 
have found support for the negative relationship between the two constructs (Harter et al. 2002; 
Nahrgang et al., 2011).  Only partial support for the negative relationship between employee 
engagement and total injury rate was found in the current study.  In 2007, employee engagement 
had a non-significant positive relationship with total injury rate.  For 2008, 2009, and the overall 
correlation for 2007-2009 employee engagement did prove to have a significant negative 
relationship with total injury rate.  Therefore, due to the 2007 non-significant correlation, partial 
support was found for the employee engagement and total injury rate relationship. 
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 In the current study, safety climate and total injury rate were hypothesized to relate 
negatively to one another.  Though the relationship between safety climate and safety outcomes 
is well supported in the literature (Christian et al., 2009; Clark, 2006; Nahrgang, 2011; Zohar, 
2010), only partial support for the relationship was found.  Safety climate and total injury rate 
did have a negative relationship in all three years, as well as the 2007-2009 overall correlation.  
However, the correlations for 2007 and 2008 were non-significant.  Only in 2009 and in the 
composite correlation did safety climate and total injury rate have a significant negative 
relationship.  Though all correlations were in the predicated direction, only partial support was 
found for the negative relationship between safety climate and total injury rate. 
  The main hypothesis for the current study was that employee engagement would mediate 
the relationship between supportive leadership and total injury rate.  Theory, such as the Job-
Demands Job-Resources Model, supports the existence of this mediated relationship, though this 
study was the first to investigate the relationship empirically.  The bootstrapping method for 
mediation was used to test this hypothesis, due the skewed distribution of the criterion measure, 
as well as the assumed small effect size.  Partial support was found for the mediated relationship 
of supportive leadership on total injury rate by employee engagement.  The confidence intervals 
created by the bootstrapping analyses supported the mediated relationship in 2008, 2009, and 
while using all data from 2007-2009.  In none of these instances did the confidence intervals 
include zero, suggesting the mediated effects of supportive leadership on total injury rate through 
employee engagement are statistically significant.  The regression weights created by the 
bootstrapping analyses indicate higher supportive leadership related to increased employee 
engagement and decreased total injury rate.  However, the confidence intervals created for the 
2007 analysis did include zero, suggesting the mediated relationship was not significant.  
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Therefore, only partial support was found for the mediated relationship of supportive leadership 
on total injury rate by employee engagement. 
  The final hypothesis in the study stated employee engagement would mediate the 
relationship between safety climate and total injury rate.  Nahrgang and colleagues found support 
for this relationship in their 2011 meta-analysis.  Only partial support was found for the mediated 
relationship in the current study.  Again, the bootstrapping method for mediation was used to test 
this mediation hypothesis.  None of the confidence intervals created for 2007, 2008, 2009, and 
all data from 2007-2009 included zero, suggesting the indirect (mediated) effects of safety 
climate on total injury rate through employee engagement are statistically significant.  The 
regression weights created by the bootstrapping analyses for 2008, 2009, and 2007-2009 indicate 
higher safety climate related to increased employee engagement and decreased total injury rate.  
However, the regression weights for 2007 suggest higher safety climate related to decreased 
employee engagement which was then related to increased total injury rate.  The regression 
weights also indicated safety climate was significantly related to injury rate, even after including 
employee engagement in the analysis.  Therefore the support for the relationship of safety 
climate on total injury rate through employee engagement was mixed. 
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Table 8  
Summary of Results  
Hypothesis Support 
1 Supportive leadership is positively related to safety climate Full support 
2 Supportive leadership is negatively related to total injury rate Partial support 
3 Employee engagement is negatively related to total injury rate Partial support 
4 Supportive leadership is positively related to employee engagement Full support 
5 Safety climate is positively related to employee engagement Full support 
6 Safety climate is negatively related to total injury rate Partial support 
7 
Employee engagement will mediate the relationship between supportive 
leadership and total injury rate Partial support 
8 Employee engagement will mediate the relationship between safety climate 




Post Hoc Analyses 
 Analysis of the data shows that all hypotheses were supported by the 2009 data as well as 
the overall data combining 2007-2009.  Six of the eight hypotheses were supported by the 2008 
data.  Results for the two hypotheses that were not supported in 2008 were both in the predicted 
direction but did not reach significance.  Only three of the eight hypotheses were supported by 
2007 data.  These results led to a need for a more in-depth analysis of the year to year data.   
 Though the descriptive statistics for 2007 did not significantly differ from 2008, 2007 
data did not support three of the hypotheses that were supported by 2008 data.  Because of this a 
more in-depth investigation of the descriptive statistics at the individual site level by year was 
conducted.  Descriptive statistics for all of the variables in the study, broken down by site, for all 
years, as well as overall for years 2007-2009, can be seen in table 9. 
Sites were rank ordered on scores for each variable for each year of the study to examine 
patterns across sites.  The average total injury rate was then calculated for both the five highest 
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and the five lowest scoring sites on each predictor variable for each year (see Figures 2-4).  As is 
clear from these figures, the data from these sites follow the expected pattern in 2008 and 2009.  
For each of employee engagement, supportive leadership, and safety climate, the average total 
injury rate for the five highest scoring sites on that particular variable was lower than the average 
total injury rate for the five lowest scoring sites on that particular variable.  However, in 2007, 
for each of the predictor variables, the average total injury rate for the five highest scoring sites 
was higher than the average total injury rate for the five lowest scoring sites.  Based on current 
knowledge, the 2007 results are the opposite of what one would expect to see and could be a 
contributing factor to the lack of support for many of the hypotheses in 2007.  Sites with lowest 
total injury rates would be expected to be amongst the highest in the predictor variables, and vice 
versa.  
 The ANOVA investigating whether there were differences in the descriptive statistics by 
year indicated the 2007 and 2008 data were more similar to one another than either was to the 
2009 data.  However, analyzing the patterns of the descriptive statistics by sites across the 
different years suggests the 2008 and 2009 data are quite similar in this regard and the 2007 data 
is different.  This analysis helps to explain why all of the hypotheses were supported by the 2009 
data, six of the eight hypotheses were supported by the 2008 data, and only three of the eight 
were supported by the 2007 data.  Without including the 2007 data, full support was found for 
hypotheses 1, 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8, with partial support for hypotheses 2 and 6.  Including the 2007 
data, full support was found for only hypotheses 1, 4, and 5, with partial support for the rest. 
One possibility as to why the 2007 data does not follow the predicted pattern could be the 
rotational leadership policy at the utility company.  In 2005, the utility instituted a program in 
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which managers at the different sites rotated positions on a set schedule.  Leadership rotated 
between various manager/supervisor positions roughly every six to 12 months, depending on 
person, sites, and other circumstances. This resulted in a high level of turnover among 
leadership, while working groups stayed relatively consistent.  It is possible employees were still 
getting used to this program in 2007, and had become more acclimated by 2008 and 2009, thus 
having less of an impact on survey results in later years. 
Another possible reason the 2007 data does not follow a predictable pattern could stem 
from random variability.  When talking about occupational safety, Krause (2005) states “a given 
exposure today has a different result than it will tomorrow, simply by chance” (p.14).  This is to 
say, the same mistake may lead to an incident one day and not the next, just by chance alone.  
Krause (2005) is also quick to state he does not mean to say safety is ultimately luck, but that 
“incident frequency is subject to random variability” (p. 14).  Random variability could be one 
way to explain the patterns of the 2007 dataset and furthermore the lack of support of the 
majority of hypotheses by the 2007 data. 
 Since the patterns of the 2008 and 2009 data are so similar the question arises of why did 
the 2009 data support all of the hypotheses when the 2008 data supported only six of the eight.  
There are two possible explanations for this.  The first goes back to the AVONA of the 
descriptive statistics by year.  The ANOVA indicated the average of all of the 2009 predictor 
variables were significantly lower than the 2008 predictor averages.  Also, the average total 
injury rate in 2009 was significantly higher than in 2008.  It could be possible the total injury 
rates were too small in 2008 for the Pearson r correlate coefficient to be able to detect an effect.  
This would also explain why the mediation analyses were significant in 2008 when the 
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correlations were not, the bootstrapping method for mediation is designed to increase the 
likelihood of detecting small effect sizes. 
 The second possible explanation for why results that were significant in 2009 were not in 
2008 is a simple one: sample size.  In 2008 only half of the population was invited to participate 
in the survey, whereas in 2009 the entire population was invited.  Accordingly, this resulted in 
the 2008 sample being roughly half the size of the 2009 sample (569 compared to 1,133).  In 
2009 there was more data, and in general more variance, which increases the chance of finding 
smaller effect sizes.  Two hypotheses were not supported by the 2008 data set, supportive 
leadership and safety climate negatively relating to total injury rate.  In both cases the 
relationship between the two variables was in fact found to be negative, but was non-significant.  
It is possible that if the 2008 data had included more data these correlations would have reached 
significance.   
 Taking the above information into account, if bootstrapping had been used to test 
hypotheses 2 and 6, instead of the Pearson r correlation coefficient, it is possible support would 
have been found for these hypotheses that were not originally supported by the 2008 data.  
Bootstrapping is able to detect smaller effect sizes and does not need as large of a sample size as 
the Pearson r correlation coefficient.  Based on this idea, bootstrapping was used to test the direct 
relationships predicted in hypotheses 2 and 6 for the 2008 data.  Hypothesis 2 predicted 
supportive leadership would have a negative relationship with total injury rate and hypothesis 6 
predicted safety climate would have a negative relationship with total injury date.  Bootstrapping 
results can be seen in table 10.  Unfortunately, results were similar to those results from the 
Pearson r correlations.  Regression weights were in the predicted direction (negative), but failed 
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to reach significance for both of the relationships.  Confidence intervals for both relationships 
included zero and therefore were not significant.  The rest of the relationships predicted in 
hypotheses 1-6 were also tested using bootstrapping and similar results were found, there were 
no meaningful differences between the bootstrap correlations and the Pearson r correlations.   
Contribution to Current Knowledge 
 The main purpose of the current study was to test the mediation of supportive leadership 
on safety outcomes by employee engagement.  The theory supporting the Job-Demands Job-
Resources Model supports this mediated relationship, but to this date it had not been tested 
empirically.  Previous studies have looked at parts of the relationship individually.  Many studies 
have looked at leadership and its relationship with safety outcomes through multiple mediators 
and moderators (Barling et al., 2002; Hofmann & Morgeson, 1999; Kelloway et al., 2006; 
Nahrgang et al., 2011; Zohar, 2002;).  Two recent studies have found a significant relationship 
between leadership and employee engagement (Ayree et al., 2012; Song et al., 2012).  Studies 
relating employee engagement to safety outcomes are not as prevalent as those around leadership 
and safety outcomes, but the few studies that have been conducted have shown a negative 
relationship between the two variables (Harter et al. 2002; Nahrgang et al., 2011).   This study 
integrated these lines of research as well as lent support to one part of the JRD model that had 
yet to be tested, the relationship between leadership and safety outcomes as mediated by 
employee engagement. 
 Another purpose of the study was to add support to the relationship of safety climate and 
safety outcomes mediated by employee engagement.  Many studies support parts of this 
relationship.  The safety climate and safety outcomes relationship is one of the most well 
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supported findings in the safety literature, including multiple meta-analyses and reviews 
(Christian et al., 2009; Clark, 2006; Nahrgang et al., 2011; Zohar, 2010).  The relationship 
between safety climate and employee engagement is not commonly studied, however there is 
some support for a positive relationship between the two constructs (Law et. al., 2011).  A recent 
meta-analysis looking at the JDR model and safety outcomes found support for the mediation of 
the safety climate and safety outcomes relationship by employee engagement (Nahrgang et al., 
2011).   The current study lent additional support to this relationship. 
 In addition to the main purpose of the study, support was also found for the significant 
positive relationships between supportive leadership, employee engagement, and safety climate.  
These findings are consistent with studies regarding leadership and safety climate and their 
relationship with employee engagement (Ayree et al., 2012; Law et. al., 2011; Nahrgang et al., 
2011; Song et al., 2012). This study also lends further support to the relationship between 
leadership and safety climate (Barling et al., 2002; Kelloway et al., 2006; Zohar, 2002). 
 The results from the current study have some important contributions to current 
knowledge.  This study demonstrated the importance of employee engagement regarding safety 
outcomes.  In the occupational safety literature, the majority of the focus surrounds determining 
how leadership and safety climate relate to safety outcomes.  The current study lends support to 
the theory that both leadership and safety climate relate to safety outcomes through employee 
engagement.  This is an important development in the safety literature and should help to guide 
researchers in their future exploration of these constructs. 
 
 




 The current study tested the meditated relationship of supportive leadership on safety 
outcomes by employee engagement, a relationship that had not been empirically tested before 
now, and also lends further support to the JDR model.  However, as in all research, there are 
limitations.  
Design 
 The first limitation of the study was that it employed a survey in which participation was 
self-selected.  This can result in bias if the answers of those who participated in the survey differ 
from the potential answers of those who chose not to participate.  For example, it is possible 
individuals who chose not to participate did so because they are disengaged, or, perhaps those 
who did participate were highly engaged.  Either of these scenarios would lead to a bias in the 
survey data.  Those who chose to participate versus those who did not participate may also differ 
on characteristics not directly related to the current study, such as work load or 
conscientiousness.  Any difference between the two groups could lead to bias in the data.  
Because participation in the questionnaire portion of this study was voluntary volunteer and non-
response bias become possible limitations of the study.  
The current study used a field study design.  While a field study has the benefit of being 
in a natural setting, it does have some drawbacks.  First, there was not a manipulated variable, 
which, along with the natural setting, prevents the implication of causation.  Second, the 
correlational design also prevents the establishment of causation.  Additionally, though this study 
used archival data collected over the course of three years, individuals could not be tracked over 
time and the criterion measure only existed at the site level.  The study of the relationship 
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between supportive leadership and safety outcomes mediated by employee engagement would 
benefit from a longitudinal design to account for changes over time. 
Another limitation would be that alternative constructs that are known to be related to 
constructs within the study were not controlled for in the current study.  For example, meta-
analyses have shown the significance of personality characteristics, job attitudes, safety 
motivation, safety knowledge, risks and hazards, physical demands, complexity, and autonomy 
in predicting safety outcomes (Christian et al., 2009; Clark, 2005: Nahrgang et al., 2011).  Since 
these constructs were not included in the study the ability to offer other explanations for the 
significant relationships is limited. 
Measures 
 To measure supportive leadership, safety climate, and employee engagement this study 
used archival data from a questionnaire designed by a psychologist within the organization of 
study.  Since the scales used in this study were not scales that were already supported by the 
literature and prior research reliability and validity are called into question.  All scales had 
acceptable internal consistency reliabilities, ranging from α=.76 to α=.88.  Regarding validity, 
while scales were created through theory and common best practices for employee engagement 
surveys, criterion related validity has not been established.  Future research on studied 
relationships would benefit from using already existing and proven measures of the predictor 
variables, supportive leadership, safety climate, and employee engagement.  Multiple heavily 
researched scales measuring safety climate and employee engagement are available.  However, a 
well tested and supported scale to measure the construct of supportive leadership does not exist 
in the current literature.          
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The current study employed self-report measures which are associated with several 
limitations.  Participants completed surveys regarding their views on supportive leadership, 
safety climate, and employee engagement.  Common method variance could artificially inflate 
the associations between these constructs.  Self-report measures are also thought to be subjective 
and influenced by social desirability bias.  Levels of variables thought to be more socially 
desirable by the organization could be inflated and levels of variables thought to be less socially 
desirable could be deflated.  In the case of this study, all predictor variables could be viewed as 
socially desirable by the organization and therefore could be inflated.  Participants were assured 
of confidentially of survey responses; however, there is no way to know if they believed that to 
be true.  Injury and first aid instances are also at least partially self-reported, are not anonymous, 
and are most likely seen as less desirable by the organization.  Employees may also fear negative 
consequences for reporting an injury.  Due to the previously stated factors, it is possible injury 
and first aid instances could be attenuated.   
The sample of participants used in this study makes generalization of the findings 
somewhat limited.  This study utilized employees of a single organization.  While participants 
worked at multiple locations and in different job types, all locations were the same type of power 
generation site.  Therefore, generalizing to a different type of environment could be problematic.  
Additionally, as noted previously, participation in the survey aspect of the study was voluntary.  
This could result in volunteer bias and limit the ability to generalize the results of this study to an 
entire population.    
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Implications for Future Research and Practice 
The current study has multiple implications.  First, hundreds of empirical studies and 
multiple meta-analyses have attempted to discover the antecedents of safety outcomes.  A great 
deal of the research has focused on leadership and safety climate.  The connection between these 
two constructs and multiple types of safety outcomes is well supported.  However, there is little 
research investigating employee engagement as a possible antecedent of safety outcomes 
(Christian et al., 2009; Clark, 2006; Nahrgang et al., 2011), even though the JDR model would 
argue it is the motivational mechanism through which leadership and safety climate relate to 
safety outcomes, thus making employee engagement an essential piece of the puzzle.  The 
current study showed employee engagement as a significant predictor of safety outcomes, as well 
as a mediator of the relationship between safety outcomes and two of the most well supported 
antecedents, leadership and safety climate.  This finding is in direct support of fundamental 
assumptions of the JDR and clearly poses a question for future research, what is the role of 
employee engagement in the leadership and safety relationship and the safety climate and safety 
relationship.    
The results of the current study indicate the need for future research to increase the focus 
on employee engagement as an important construct in the safety literature.  The JDR model 
posits employee engagement as a mediator between the relationships of multiple different job 
demands and job resources and performance.  The current study looked specifically at the job 
resources of safety climate and supportive leadership and used injuries as the performance 
measure.  Future research on the JDR model should look to replicate these findings as well 
expand them to include other job resources and job demands.  Though many job resources and 
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job demands have been studied in relation to safety outcomes, very few of these studies have 
also included measures of employee engagement or burnout (Christian et al., 2009).  Fully 
integrating the JDR model into the occupational safety research has at least three possible 
benefits: 1) building greater and more diverse support for the JDR model, 2) painting a more 
complete picture of occupational safety by incorporating a theoretical structure that logically 
integrates multiple constructs, and 3) reducing the incidence of accidents, injuries, and deaths in 
the workplace through a better understanding safety. 
In addition to an increased focus on employee engagement, the current study also has 
implications for future research on the relationship between leadership and safety outcomes.  
Many studies in the occupational safety field focus specially on safety related leadership 
behaviors, such as management commitment and communication around safety (Mohamad, 
2002) and leaders as safety role-models (Katz-Navon et al., 2007).  Parker and colleagues (2001) 
took a different approach, looking at supportive supervision not directly linked to safety.  Their 
results showed supportive supervision was predictive of working safely one year later.  The 
current study took a similar view, by measuring supportive leadership, which was not safety 
specific.  The results of the current study, supporting the relationship between supportive 
leadership and safety outcomes, suggest the occupational safety literature would benefit from an 
expanded view of leadership; with future studies incorporating more diverse types of leadership, 
not just those that are specific to safety.  Some examples of various types of leadership that have 
not been heavily studied in regards to safety outcomes are dark side traits (Dalal & Nolan, 2009; 
Furrnham, Trickey, & Hyde, 2012)  and authentic leadership (Eid, Mearns, Larsson, Laberg, & 
Johnsen, 2012).  Research on a variety of leadership types and how they relate to occupational 
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safety would help increase the overall understanding of the leadership and safety relationship, 
which would hopefully lead to fewer accidents and injuries over time. 
There are also applied implications to a stronger focus on various types of leadership 
behaviors.  While leadership behaviors around safety are important, it is possible a strong focus 
on these would only be a short-term fix for improving safety.  A more long-term and sustainable 
solution for improving safety could be improving leadership behaviors in general.  Better 
leadership overall would create a healthy culture and high employee engagement, which would 
then support an environment where safety is simply a way life, instead of just something a 
frontline worker is always hearing about from their manager.  This would be especially 
beneficial for organizations where managers have short tenures with their subordinates, due to 
rotational leadership programs (which was the case for the organization in the current study), or 
otherwise.  Leaders and employees having to acclimate themselves to one every 12 to 18 months 
could have detrimental effects on safety performance, due to the instability and possible turmoil 
change can bring to a group.  If high employee engagement and safety are already embedded as 
part of the culture of the organization, they can serve as buffers against the negative effects brief 
leadership tenures could have on safety outcomes.  
Another research implication of the current study is its multiple year design.    Data were 
analyzed from three consecutive years at the same organization.  This is important because it can 
show the stability of an effect over time. Unfortunately, the data for the current study did not 
allow individuals to be tracked over the course of the three years, so year to year comparisons 
could not be made.  Future research regarding occupational safety should include more 
longitudinal studies. In one longitudinal study Zohar (2002b) found training supervisors to better 
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monitor and reward safety lead to a significant decrease in minor injuries and an increase in 
safety behaviors (i.e., wearing ear plugs).  Longitudinal studies would allow researchers to imply 
cause and effect, rather than just predictive relationships.  Gaining a better understanding of the 
causes of accidents could have a monumental affect on reducing injuries and fatalities within 
organizations.  
There are several applied implications of the current study.  Safety is of paramount 
importance to all organizations, especially those who have employees working in situations with 
increased risk.  The cost of workplace injuries and fatalities is substantial, both financially and 
personally.  The current study helps in the understanding of what constructs are predictive of 
injuries and increases the current knowledge of this topic.  Organizations could use this 
information in inform their decisions on leadership training, employee engagement initiatives, 
and other activities around the company.  The current study shows leader behavior does not have 
to be solely focused on safety in order to be related to safety outcomes.  Leaders who are 
supportive of their employees tend to have more engaged employees and a lower injury rate.  
Leadership training could be designed to incorporate this information, helping leaders understand 
it is not just their behaviors around safety that are related to injuries, but their actions in general.   
The results of the current study also offer leaders a way to discuss safety with their 
employees.  It is not just researchers or managers that want to know what relates to accidents and 
injuries, employees want to understand as well.  Employees working on the front lines are in 
high risk situations every day and they want to do whatever they can to help ensure they make it 
home every night.  Discussing psychological theories, such as the Job-Demands Job-Resources 
model, does not resonate with employees.  However, presenting workers with data and numbers, 
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or what one could call “proof,” has the possibility of gaining their attention.  Having the 
information and results from the current study, and hopefully subsequent studies, allows 
managers to clearly tell their employees why their engagement and safety climate are important, 
with numbers to back them up.  Once frontline workers are focused on these concepts they can 
be more aware of their behaviors, and safer overall.  
The current study focuses on the importance of employee engagement on safety 
outcomes.  Organizations that use the information gained from the current study might introduce 
initiatives to increase employee engagement in order to decrease injury rates.  The results of 
successful employee engagement initiatives could not only lead to fewer injuries but could also 
affect many other organizational outcomes.  A brief review of the engagement literature stated 
that engaged employees are more creative, more productive, and more willing to go the extra 
mile (Bakker & Schaufeli, 2008).  Employee engagement has also been found to be related to 
overall performance, and in-role and extra-role behavior (Bakker et al., 2004; Kimbell & Nink, 
2006; Xanthopoulou et al., 2009).  Employee engagement is also related to employee retention, 
which is important to organizations given the high cost of turnover.  According to The Gallup 
Organization employee retention is 44% higher for engaged employees over nonengaged and 
actively disengaged employees (Kimbell & Nink, 2006).  A focus on employee engagement 
could not only lead an organization to fewer injuries but to increased performance in multiple 
performance areas.   





In conclusion, the current study lends partial empirical support for the previously 
untested relationship between supportive leadership, employee engagement, and safety 
outcomes, in which the relationship between supportive leadership and safety outcomes is 
mediated by employee engagement.  This finding adds important information to the literature on 
the topic and suggests further research is needed to conclusively determine the relationship 
between the three constructs.  The current findings also have applied implications.  Previously, 
employee engagement has not been considered a major predictor of safety outcomes.  The 
current study draws much needed attention to employee engagement and showcases it as an 
important factor in regards to safety outcomes. While one study, which showed only partial 
support for the key hypotheses, cannot determine the true relationship between these constructs, 
the current research lends added support for the JDR model and suggests there are unexplained 
associations between the constructs of supportive leadership, safety climate, employee 
engagement, and safety outcomes which merit future exploration.   
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Table 10  
Bootstrapping of Correlations with Total Injury Rate for 2008  
Bootstrap Results Regression 
Weights 
  Percentile 95% CI Bias Corrected 95% CI 
 
Lower Upper Lower Upper  
Safety Climate -0.128 0.002 -0.128 0.002 -0.060 
Supportive Leadership -0.126 0.004 -0.126 0.004 -0.058 
CI = confidence interval 








Figure 2. Average total injury rates per year for high scoring employee engagement sites and low 
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Figure 3. Average total injury rates per year for high scoring supportive leadership sites and low 
scoring supportive leadership sites, divided at the median. 
 
Figure 4. Average total injury rates per year for high scoring safety climate sites and low scoring 
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